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THE NEW SUPREME COURT
by PHILIP B. KURLAND*t
The Supreme Court of the United States is a peculiar institution. It is peculiar in two senses: it is peculiar in the sense
that it is unique; it is peculiar, too, in the sense that it is strange.
I think we are usually aware that the Supreme Court is
both strange and unique. What we tend to forget is that it is an
institution. As a people we generally ignore the institutional
aspects of our government. And many of our present ills
derive from this failure to comprehend that government institutions - like other institutions of our society - are both
more than and different from the men who happen, at any given
time, to occupy office. If the consequences of this failure are not
immediately discernible, they are nonetheless grave. Indeed, I
respectfully submit, it is this failure of perception that may very
well prove fatal to the basic American concept of democratic
government.
When this nation was born, the Constitution served the
function of assigning different powers to different branches of
government. It was recognized by the Founding Fathers, if not
by their successors, that power is corrupting of the individuals
who exercise it and dangerous to the people on whose behalf
those powers are theoretically exercised. The Constitution,
therefore, divided power, not only between the nation and the
states in that unique scheme that was American federalism, but
within the national government among three branches. The
constitutionally commanded separation of powers and system of
checks and balances were thought necessary to the preservation
of individual freedom.
It is, in part, the rejection of these checks and balances and
separation of powers that has resulted in the inordinate loss of
individual freedom from which we suffer today and which is
likely to be exacerbated tomorrow. For we are already living
in an era in which the individual has been subordinated to a
* Professor of law at the University of Chicago Law School. After
acquiring degrees from the University of Pennsylvania and Harvard Law
School, Mr. Kurland served as law clerk to U.S. Appellate Court Justice
Jerome Frank and to Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter. Eight
books he has written or edited deal with one aspect or another of the
Supreme Court, and these are in addition to the annual Supreme Court
Review, published by the University of Chicago Press.
t Reprinted from The University of Chicago Magazine, July/August,
1973. Copyright © 1973, The University of Chicago.
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whole group of corporate elements in our society, not least of
which is government itself.
One need spend very little time in Washington, D.C., to
recognize that, for the most part, government exists for its own
sake and not for the benefit of the people to whom it should be
responsible. Nor is Springfield or City Hall any different on
this score. It was this condition that John Adams sought to
prevent when he advocated a government of laws and not of men.
Instead of a division of function between local and national
government, we have witnessed over the last century a steady
accumulation of national power with a concomitant reduction
in local authority. Certainly this is due to a multitude of
causes. In many ways it is the natural result of our technological progress that has reduced space and time through better or at least quicker - means of transportation and communication, that has, indeed, made one society out of many. In no
small measure, however, it is also a consequence of an unwillingness on the part of local government to assume its obligations
and responsibilities.
And this has been matched by a grasp for power by the
central government that was made to exceed even the bureaucratic reach. When the lawyers for the rich warned us of the
dangers inherent in the national income tax, we tended to deride
them for special pleading. But it is the national income tax
that has made the states dependent on the charity of the national
government, charity which in its latest form is labeled "revenue
sharing." Charity may be the greatest of individual virtues;
it is the most stifling of governmental powers.
Just as the states have become moribund as agencies of
government, destroying the safeguards that federalism was
intended to secure, so too have we seen the deterioration of
separation of powers in the national sphere. Here again the
centralization of power in the executive branch is in some
measure due to the inordinate growth of government that has
made it possible for Congress adequately to oversee the functions
of that government. In part, it is due to the failure of Congress
to perform the tasks assigned to it, because it was easier to let
someone else do it. In part, it is due to the desire and demand
for power - some may call it usurpation - by the executive
branch itself.
THE PERSONALITY APPROACH

Meanwhile, the American people have tended to measure
the desirability of the result of this deterioration of representative government in terms of their personal predilections for
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the occupants of the Presidential office. When it is a President
with what has come to be called "charisma," a Franklin Delano
Roosevelt or a John Fitzgerald Kennedy, some of us have applauded the seizure of power by the President. When that
office is occupied by one whose objectives are less to our tastes,
we deplore the power that has become his to exercise.
We have not been willing to understand that when we
approve the transfer of power from Congress to the President
because we tend to trust and admire the recipient of that authority, we are assuring that his successor, too, whoever he
might be, will be able to assert the same authority, even if he
uses it to different ends. As Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and
Jackson once observed: "Evil men are rarely given power; they
take it over from better men to whom it had been entrusted."'
It is essentially since the regime of Franklin Roosevelt
that this country has become the subject of Presidential government so clearly distinguished from Congressional government
as described by Woodrow Wilson many decades ago.
EXECUTIVE POWER INTENSIFIES

But it is also true that the powers that were exerted by
Franklin Roosevelt were puny as compared with those which
are now exercised by his successors in office. For we have
arrived at the stage where the President asserts - without
meaningful challenge - powers and privileges that once were
those of the legislature, even to the point of assuming the power
over the appropriations process which was thought to be the
primary safeguard of democratic government.
(It may be recalled that it was Parliament's successful
assertion of the power over the purse that moved England from
an autocratic monarchy to a democratic polity.)
The new Presidency has ridden over even the authority of
the old-line executive departments. These executive departments have been reduced to menial status. All policy is made
and largely effected by what is benignly known as "the White
House staff," a staff that once could be more than amply housed
in a single wing of the White House, but which now sprawls
through buildings that once contained the entire Department
of State and several other old-line departments as well.
And, without a semblance of substantial concern by the
people or their elected representatives, the President now proposes to reorganize the national government to reduce further
the power of these departments by consolidating them in a way
that affords greater and greater White House control. Yes, that
reorganization may make for more efficiency, although I doubt
1 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 160 (1945).
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it. But as Mr. Justice Douglas once noted: "All executive
power from the reign of ancient kings to the rule of
'2
modern dictators - has the outward appearance of efficiency."
It may be that the problem of the ever-expanding executive
power has come closer to American consciousness in recent years
as Presidents - and I am certainly speaking of more than one
have undertaken to engage this country in foreign wars
without Congressional authority, as Truman and Eisenhower
and Kennedy did; to impose economic controls by fiat, as Kennedy and Nixon have done; to determine which Congressional
programs they will effectuate and which they will ignore, as
Truman and Kennedy and Nixon have done; and to do all
these things behind a cloak of secrecy that cannot be penetrated
even by the elected representatives of the people - as certainly
all of them have done.
And all of this has been justified by invoking precedents,
precedents to which the American people took no exception
because the leaders who indulged in this abuse of power were
trusted by them to bring about the right ends, even if by the
wrong means.
It was Mr. Justice Frankfurter who reminded us, when the
Court stopped the exertion of executive authority in the case of
the seizure of the steel mills by the President: "The accretion
of dangerous power does not come in a day. It does come,
however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested
'
assertion of authority. 1
I have dwelled on the Presidency-and the violation of its
institutional limits because they are easily discerned and, today at
least, readily acknowledged. Senators who acquiesced for years
in Presidential aggrandizement are suddenly vocally cognizant
of the dangers. It remains to be seen whether Congress has the
backbone to indulge more than empty words to reestablish its
constitutional authority. (Despite "Watergate," the House continues to be the tail to the presidential kite.)
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

As with the White House, so, too, with the Supreme Court.
During the tenure of Chief Justice Warren, there were many
who could find no fault with the constantly expanding power
of the judiciary. For surely it was directed to ends of which
they approved.
Now that the personnel of the Court has
changed, and with that change has come a change in the ap2 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629 (1952).
3

Id. at 594.
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parent values of the justices, these same people who once so
loudly acclaimed the assertion of judicial authority are now
concerned to assure that the judiciary be kept in its sphere.
The lesson of the Sorcerer's Apprentice must be learned once
again.
Just as it may be too late to restore the Presidency to its
proper dimensions, so it may be impossible to confine the Court.
Despite the plentiful rhetoric, the question is no longer whether
we should have an activist Court. An activist Court is one that
assumes capacities to govern in broader and broader areas.
An activist Court is one that interferes with legislative and
executive judgments on the basis of its own contrary personal
predilections.
But such a Court may have either a conservative or liberal
bias. It will remain an activist Court even if its clientele
changes from the laborer, the black, and the economically deprived, to big business, big labor, and big government. The
Nine Old Men whom Roosevelt sought to displace were no less
an activist Court than the Warren Court, whose justices President Nixon has - almost as successfully so far - sought to
replace.
The Burger Court with its inheritance of authority is not
likely to prove less activist, but only less liberal. And those who
scorned the idea of institutional limitations - constitutional
limitations if you will - are suddenly taken with the importance
of those limitations. Too late.
RESPONSIBILITY AND LIFE TENURE

There are, however, several differences between the judicial
and executive branches of the national government that are
relevant here. The first is that the judicial branch has no direct
Where the President must be
responsibility to the people.
chosen every four years - representatives every two and senators every six - the judicial appointees remain in office for
life. A new Court, unlike a new administration or a new
And, contrary to public
Congress, is a fortuitous event.
opinion, a new Court does not derive from the appointment of
a new chief justice. For the other justices are not subordinate
to the chief justice. The chief justice has no lawmaking authority that is greater than that of his judicial brethren.
Indeed, a new Court, in the sense of a new jurisprudence,
need not even be brought about by a change of a majority of
the personnel and, on the other hand, may be brought about
even where the personnel does not change at all. I would submit
as examples the fact that the Roosevelt Court came into exis-
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tence, in the sense of the end of the era of "substantive due
process," when Justices Hughes and Roberts became firmly
attached to the theretofore dissenting trio of Brandeis, Stone
and Cardozo, even before any Roosevelt appointee joined it.
Again, the Warren Court did not come into existence in
1954, when Warren was appointed and the School Desegregation
Cases4 were decided. (The school cases would have been decided
the way they were had Vinson survived to preside over that
term of Court.) The Warren Court - a Court with its own
patent judicial philosophy - did not come into existence really
until the decision in a case called Mapp v. Ohio5 made it clear
that the Court was prepared to impose on the states its own
expansive notions of a code of criminal procedure, and the
decision in Baker v. Carr," which made it clear that the Court
was prepared to prescribe the proper form of government for
the states.
And it was called the Warren Court because Warren was
its chairman, not because Warren was its leader. The doctrines
of the Warren Court had been formulated by Justices Black and
Douglas long before the advent of Warren, and those two
justices remained the Warren Court's doctrinal leaders throughout its life.
ACQUIESCENCE NECESSARY

There is, moreover, one difference of no small importance
between the accretion of power in the judiciary and that which
has occurred in the executive branch. The judiciary is inherently a governmental weakling. Its power is dependent upon
acquiescence in its orders by the other branches of government.
Thus, the school segregation decisions were meaningless words
so long as President Eisenhower and the Congress refused the
approval and cooperation of their powers that could make the
decisions meaningful.
Indeed, much of the Court's alleged successes in recent
years have been verbal rather than real, with the result that
it has been given both credit and blame which do not properly
belong to it.
For example, if we examine the three areas in which the
Court established its reputation for doing good during the Warren regime, we discover something less than glorious achievement. One needn't live in Chicago, under the shadow of
4 See Oliver Brown v. Bd. of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294
(1955); Brown v. Bd. of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Gebhart v. Belton, 345 U.S. 972
(1953).
5 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
6 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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yesterday's headlines, to know that separation of the races, in
and out of school, remains - despite the Court's decision the dominant problem of American society.
It is clear that the state legislatures have been reapportioned in accordance with the commands of the federal courts,
commands frequently issued by divided federal three-judge
courts, divided according to the political party allegiance of
each of the judges. Even so, the shift of seats in the legislatures
has been from a conservative farm constituency to a more
conservative suburban constituency.
The plight of urban America is no more the direct concern
of the new legislatures than it was of the old ones. The cure
has been of a symptom rather than a disease. For even under
the "new equality" of the Warren Court, the power of gerrymander has remained undisturbed. Corporate, i.e., group, interests as distinguished from individual interests are well served
under the new allocation as they were under the old one.
When we come to that area of constitutional law which has
aroused perhaps the greatest political furor, the Supreme
Court's decisions in the area of criminal justice, we again see
little change wrought by the Court's judgments. Surely the
Court is not to blame for the crime wave that inundates the
country. Certainly, as a result of the Court's decisions, there
are criminals on the loose who might otherwise have been
punished.
But it is ludicrous to suggest that the overabundance of
criminals that we have with us are charting their courses by
the decisions of the Supreme Court. Law is probably the last
thing in the minds of those who have made the FBI crime
statistics look like our national debt, climbing at an even more
rapid rate.
On the other hand, when it is noted that the function of
the Court's rulings was not to free the guilty but to chastise
the police and the prosecutor so that they would not engage in
police-state tactics against the innocent citizen, it must be
recognized that the Supreme Court's decisions seem to have
brought about no noticeable improvement in police behavior,
either. Mr. Justice Holmes' dictum is as applicable to the
Warren Court's activities as to that of all its predecessors.
Courts are capable of bringing about only molecular, and not
molar, changes in our society.
Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the Court's behavior is not unimportant. If it affirms basic ethical concepts,
which may be as old as the decalog or the glories of Greece or
Rome, it provides a strong moral force for good, but by way
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of example rather than precept. And, then, none knows better
than those now living that molecular changes, too, can be of no
small consequence when enough molecules are rearranged to
form new patterns or destroy old ones.
UNPREDICTABLE

DIFFERENCE

That the new Court - the Burger Court - is different
from the old one - the Warren Court - is easily acknowledged,
and yet prediction of what results that difference is going to
bring about would be foolhardy. One could hardly have anticipated that the Burger Court would have been the one to decide
that the death penalty as it has been applied is unconstitutional.
The Warren Court had that question before it again and again.
Never did it face up to the question and hold, as the Burger
Court did last term, that the death penalty violated the "cruel
or unusual punishment" clause of the Eighth Amendment.
And yet every member of the five-man majority in that case
was a holdover from the Warren Court, and every dissenting
member of the Court in that case was a Nixon appointee.
And it was the Burger Court that, earlier this year, struck
down state laws banning abortions, a result repeatedly sought
from and repeatedly denied by the Warren Court. It cannot be
said that precedent or personal predilection was an adequate
basis for predicting the outcome of the capital punishment cases
or the abortion cases.
NEW DIRECTIONS

On the other hand, we have already seen that the Burger
Court has drawn back from an extension of the Warren Court's
decisions in the area of criminal procedure. The infamous
Miranda rule that prevented convictions for police failure to
instruct the accused of his right to silence and to counsel has not
been overruled but stopped in its tracks - tracks made, until
the advent of the Burger Court, by seven-league boots.
The sanctification of the jury trial by the Warren Court
has been reversed by the Burger Court, in the latter's holdings
that less than twelve persons can properly constitute a jury even in the federal courts - and, indeed, that a less than
unanimous verdict satisfies the demands of the Constitution.
If pornography has received less protection from the Burger Court than it did from the Warren Court - although it
should be remembered that Chief Justice Warren himself was
not often to be found on the side of the First Amendment against
the claims for suppression of obscenity - it might be noted that
it was the Burger Court that ruled in favor of the right of the
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New York Times to publish classified data purloined from the
secret files of the Defense Department.
The Court is a complex mechanism. Those who would
paint it with a broad brush and in a single color cannot be true
to the subject or to the viewer for whose benefit the image is
created. The perspective of time will reveal the new Court's
dominant characteristics. They have not yet emerged.
Comparisons, moreover, are difficult if not impossible. The
new Court will be facing new problems arising in new contexts.
We live in a volatile society and the law - even as pronounced
by the most powerful judicial tribunal in the world - remains
essentially a response to the demands of its society rather than
a formulator of that society.
In some ways, the new Court will be faced with harder
questions than its predecessor was prepared to meet. I have
already made reference to the capital punishment cases. Let
me offer one more example. The Warren Court chose not to
answer the question whether non-Southern states, too, have
obligations to desegregate their schools. But the Burger Court
has, in the Denver 7 case, held applicable to the North, East, and
West, the rules that the Warren Court would apply only to the
South.
Then, too, the Burger Court will have important new facts
to assay in reaching its conclusions about the continued validity
of earlier decisions. Just to stick to the school desegregation
question for the moment, it should be noted that Brown v. Board
of Education" rested on the proposition that equality of educational opportunity was dependent on desegregation of the
schools. Recent scientific - or quasi-scientific - data have
undermined that premise. Work culminating in the Coleman
Report,9 the Moynihan and Mosteller book,1° the study by David
Armor," and the recent book by Christopher Jencks 12 seems to
suggest that it is not the educational process that creates the
differences in educational achievement of blacks and whites.
How should the Court utilize the new data which contradict
the social science evidence on which the Court purported to rely
in Brown? Surely it is not going to reverse Brown. But how
is it going to accommodate the law to the facts?
7Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 of Denver, 409 U.S. 818 (1973).
8 347 U.S. 488 (1954).
9 Office of Education, U.S. Dept. HEW, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY (1966).
10 F. MOSTELLER

& D.

MOYNIHAN,

ON

EQUALITY

OF

EDUCATIONAL

OPPORTUNITY (1972).
11 D. Armor, The Evidence on Bussing, Reseorch Report; Public In-

terest Magazine at 90-126 (Summer 1972).
12C.

JENCKS,

CHRISTOPHER
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IN

PERSPECTIVE

(1973).
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DECISION AS SYMBOL

So, too, we have evidence that the Mirandarule has brought
about none of the results that were anticipated. Whether or not
the fourfold warning is delivered to an accused, he seems to
behave in the same way, and so, too, do his prosecutors. These
facts confound the condemners of the Miranda decision no less
than its defenders. But what is the Court to do about it? The
Miranda decision, like the Brown case, is more important now
as a symbol than as a reality.
Not only is the experiential base on which the Burger Court
operates different from that of its predecessor, so too, of
necessity is its legal base. Its inheritance is different from that
of the Warren Court. One of the major determinants of the
new Court's behavior will be its attitude toward precedents,
including the precedents of the Warren Court. And the question will be whether the Burger Court will do as the Warren
Court did or as the Warren Court said. For surely, no Court
ever treated precedents more cavalierly than did the Warren
Court. A similar attitude on the part of the Burger Court
could soon doom all the judgments of recent years. And, as
might be expected, the new Court has already followed example
rather than precept. If it has not overruled precedents, it has
distinguished them in such a way as to leave them all but dead.
Members of the Warren Court asserted that no judgment
was binding on them in which they did not personally participate. Such a rule would mean that precedents of the Warren
Court would remain extant only until the President makes one
more appointment to the high court bench.
Still another question about the new Court, yet to be answered, is how the justices themselves will regard the Court's
proper role. I do not refer here to the sterile concept of strict
construction, but rather to which groups will be selected by the
Court as its clientele, its wards, its constituency, however you
wish to phrase it.
History has revealed that the rhetoric of judicial opinions has
remained fairly consistent, however disparate the results. The
banners of freedom and equality have been raised by the Court
over very different contending forces. It was freedom freedom of contract - that grounded the actions of the followers of Mr. Justice Field in affording protection to commercial
and industrial interests against the onslaught of government
regulation. It was the notion of equality that so long doomed
the labor unions to government by injunction. The answer to
the question of who will be the beneficiary of the new Court's
benevolence remains in the womb of time. Thus far the Burger
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Court seems to have taken only "Women's
protective wing.

Lib" under its

THE ABDICATION VACUUM

One more factor in the fashioning of the Burger Court will
be the action or inaction of other branches of the American
government. It surely must be conceded that, in no small
measure, the original impetus for the Warren Court's jurisprudence came from the failure of the national and state
governments to address meaningfully the myriad of problems
deriving from the racial discrimination that plagued the nation;
from the failure of the state legislatures to abide the commands
of their own constitution to apportion their legislatures democratically; from the failure of the states to provide against the
abuses of the criminal laws, even after these abuses had been
pointed out to them by the Supreme Court. If the other branches
of government undertake to perform their functions and attempt
to resolve the societal problems that sicken the nation, there
may be no reason for the judicial branch to intervene at all;
certainly there will be less compulsion to do so.
Allow me a few minutes more to speak of the Burger
Court's attitude toward state power and authority. First, however, I would make it clear that the one constant factor in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence, from Chief Justice Marshall's
day to this one, has been its persistent contribution to the
movement of power from the states to the nation.
In this regard the United States Supreme Court has not
been unique. Historians have shown that it was the national
judiciaries that provided the avenue for the transfer of power
from the barons to the crown in medieval Europe. This too
was the lesson of Westminster in English history. And the
role of the national judiciary in this country has been the same,
as Jefferson saw at the outset of his controversy with Marshall
and Marshall's Supreme Court. There is no reason to suspect
that there will be a reversal of this general position by the
Burger Court. Some cases, however, such as the recent pornography decisions and criminal law cases, speak of the return of
authority to local government.
RESURGENCE OF DUE PROCESS
There are two basic means for the Supreme Court and the
other courts of the federal judicial system to invalidate state
statutes and to reverse or overrule state judicial decisions; the
equal protection clause and the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Evidence is that the former will prove less expansive under
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the Burger Court than it was under the Warren Court. Equality
will no longer be the primary slogan to justify constitutional
decisions.
On the other hand, due process - minimal standards of
decency as distinguished from equal standards of decency may well see a resurgence.
We have already witnessed some decisions that give rise
to this anticipation. But, before I build your hopes too high,
it should be made clear that there is not likely to be a judicial
revolution on this score. Equality for women will be a developing area, both under the existent statutory provisions and under
the demands of the equal protection clause - and more so if
the vagaries of the equal rights amendment become binding on
the Court. Problems of desegregation will continue to receive
friendly attention, although it is likely that the school desegregation cases have reached the end of the road. The NAACP
desire to "metropolitanize" school systems to incorporate suburbs and cities is not likely to succeed, although desegregation
among school systems throughout the country will, sooner or
later, be brought about. And the classic demands for equality in
such matters as jury selection are not likely to be stayed.
So, too, it would seem that the reapportionment cases will
not be expanded to meet the remaining essential problem of
gerrymandering, with the exception of those cases that fall
afoul the Fifteenth Amendment's ban on the inhibition of the
franchise for blacks as revealed in the Tuskegee case, 13 lo these
many years ago now. Indeed, the requirements of the simplistic
"one-man, one-vote" rule have been substantially limited in the
most recent term.
The equality cases do show that the Court is no longer
reaching out to establish doctrines of substantive equal protection, This may be seen in last term's decision in the Moose
Lodge case 14 that permitted a private club to discriminate despite
the liquor monopoly conferred by the state. And we have the
refusal of the Court to find discrimination violative of the
Constitution in Texas's allocation of welfare payments in such a
fashion that the category with the highest proportion of blacks
and Mexicans received the highest proportional cut in benefits.15
But it must be said, in all fairness, that the Burger Court has
not been niggling in its readings of federal statutes commanding
equality of treatment.
Due process requirements on the other hand, have seen less
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, Mayor of Tuskegee, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
15Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
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substantial limitations from the Burger Court. It is true that
there have been several major cases in which the Burger Court
refused to damn judgments that would surely have fallen during
the heyday of the Warren Court. The refusal to extend the
Miranda rule to exclude evidence used solely for impeachment
purposes is typical of these.' 6
FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT

REINTERPRETED

There is a burgeoning area of Supreme Court substantive
constitutional law to be found under the rubric of the "right to
travel." My own analysis is that this foreshadows a development of the third major provision of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the privileges or immunities clause, from which the notion of the
right to travel originally derived. The right to welfare benefits
and the right to a ballot, both without residency requirement,
have already been established under this new doctrine. It is in
defining the privileges or immunities clause that I expect the
Burger Court to make its major impression on the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the states.
I venture only one prediction about the Burger Court here.
For prediction is a function of scientists and fools and I know
I am not a scientist.
I predict that those who blindly worshipped the Warren
Court as the epitome of good, largely because it reflected their
own prejudices, will find the Burger Court an abomination. For
those who, equally blindly, despised the Warren Court as the
epitome of evil, largely because it rejected their own prejudices,
the Burger Court will be regarded as an improvement.
For those of us who consider ourselves somewhere in between these extremes - as we all do - it is necessary to
remember that the Supreme Court is not the government of the
United States, but only a part of it. Its primary function
remains, in part because its capacities will allow it no more, to
restrain the misbehavior of other governmental bodies. It is
overburdened with problems that should better be left outside
its ken: some too large, others too small to call on the limited
resources that the Court can bring to bear.
This is not to demean the Court's role, but to preserve it.
It remains the one governmental institution above all others
capable of affording some protection, however temporary, to
individuals and minorities against the incursion of majorities.
The primary defect of the Burger Court so far revealed is
the same defect that was observed in the Warren Court. It has
16

See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).

14

The John Marshall Journal of Practicc and Procedure

[Vol. 7:1

failed to account properly for its judgments. It has issued
decrees but it has not afforded adequate rationales for them;
it has attempted to rule by fiat rather than reason.
Perhaps the Warren Court was the right Court for the Age
of Aquarius, that period of purple passions when reason was
subordinated to emotion and righteousness was overcome by
self-righteousness.
The Age of Aquarius is dead. Its funeral was held on
November 7, 1972. What the proper appellation will be for the
age that is dawning, we do not know.
The Court may be the quiet voice of reason that inhibits a
populism that is the opposite of Aquarianism and yet is the same,
just as fascism and communism are identical opposites. It may
be the handmaiden of an executive power that is destructive
of individual freedom. It could be an ally of a legislative
resurgence that may yet make democratic government meaningful without destroying minority rights. The new Supreme
Court has not yet taken shape.
I would close with a quotation from G. K. Chesterton's
Ballad of the White Horse:
I tell you naught for your comfort.
Yea, naught for your desire.
Save that the sky grows darker yet,
And the sea rises higher.

